Programme dossier
Led by INTERPOL.
iARMS: Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System
A database rather than a field programme: the record system that makes an international firearms trace possible.
What it addresses
iARMS is infrastructure. A recovered firearm can only be traced internationally if the jurisdictions along its history can query each other's records, and until a shared system exists each trace is a bilateral request. The system holds records of firearms reported lost, stolen, smuggled or trafficked, and allows a member country to check a recovered weapon against them.
How it works
Because it is a record system, its value depends entirely on what is entered into it. A jurisdiction that does not mark weapons at import, or does not keep dealer registers, has nothing to contribute and little to gain — which is why the system and the Firearms Protocol obligations described on the firearms page are two halves of the same mechanism.
Where it applies
iARMS is not tied to a geographic corridor. It is shared infrastructure, available to any participating jurisdiction, and its usefulness in a given place depends on what that jurisdiction contributes to it rather than on where it sits. The obligations that determine that are set out on the firearms page.
For a record system the relevant map is therefore not a route but a ratification. A jurisdiction bound by the Firearms Protocol has undertaken to mark weapons at manufacture and import and to keep the records for at least ten years; one that is not has no such obligation, and a weapon passing through it can lose its history legitimately. Of the 106 jurisdictions covered on this site, 83 are parties and 23 are not.
Not parties to the Firearms Protocol — 23
Afghanistan · Belize · Botswana · Cameroon · Chad · Colombia · Djibouti · Egypt · Equatorial Guinea · Eritrea · Gambia · Georgia · Guinea · Kosovo · Kyrgyzstan · Namibia · Niger · Pakistan · Saint Lucia · Suriname · Tajikistan · Uzbekistan · Zimbabwe
That list is the practical limit on what a shared tracing system can reconstruct. The system itself is neutral about it: it will return whatever was entered, and where no obligation to enter anything exists, an accurate query returns nothing and the absence looks identical to a clean history.
The ratification count above has a second half that is easy to miss. Of the 106 jurisdictions here, 5 carry a national firearms instrument this dataset could confirm against an official register. The second figure is a statement about what registers publish, not a claim that the other jurisdictions have no such law — but a trace request runs on records kept under a domestic marking and licensing regime, so a ratification without a citable instrument is exactly where a query returns nothing.
Treaty basis
In substance the work operationalises the marking, record-keeping and tracing obligations of the Firearms Protocol. The distinction matters: a programme of this kind creates no legal powers of its own. It builds the capacity of states to use powers they already hold under instruments they have ratified, which is why a jurisdiction that is not party to the relevant instrument gains less from participation than one that is. What each instrument obliges is set out on the conventions reference.
Questions
What was iARMS?
Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System, led by INTERPOL. A database rather than a field programme: the record system that makes an international firearms trace possible. The description on this page is drawn from INTERPOL, which documents it.
What problem was iARMS designed to address?
iARMS is infrastructure. A recovered firearm can only be traced internationally if the jurisdictions along its history can query each other's records, and until a shared system exists each trace is a bilateral request. The system holds records of firearms reported lost, stolen, smuggled or trafficked, and allows a member country to check a recovered weapon against them.
Which trafficking corridors does iARMS relate to?
iARMS is not organised around a geographic corridor. It is infrastructure that any jurisdiction can draw on, which is why it appears on the firearms page rather than on a route.
What is the treaty basis for this kind of work?
In substance, the marking, record-keeping and tracing obligations of the Firearms Protocol. A programme of this kind does not create legal powers; it builds the capacity to use powers a state already has under instruments it has ratified, which is why the ratification position on each jurisdiction record matters to what such a programme can achieve there.
Is iARMS still running?
This index does not assert a current operational state for any programme in it. Funding cycles turn over faster than the pages describing them, and a dossier that claimed a programme was active would be making a claim it could not keep current. INTERPOL is the place to check, and it is linked from the sources at the foot of this page.
Why does iARMS carry no corridor?
Because it is not organised around one. Its subject is the programme family rather than a route, so the geographic entry point is the 106-jurisdiction index rather than a corridor profile. The dossiers that do address corridors are listed on the programme index.
Sources
- INTERPOL — Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System . Checked 2026-07-30.